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IN COMPANY WITH OFFENDERS FROM 
THE NEIGHBORHOOD: POLITY OF THE 
KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND 
SLOVENES 1918-1941
Hrvoje ČAPO*
Th e Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (hereaft er SHS)/Yugoslavia 
existed for twenty three years, between 1918 and 1941. During that period 
it was characterized by the harsh use of the state repressive apparatus and 
latent political dubiousness. Th e author argues the reasons for such an envi-
ronment, which he fi nds in unsolved national questions and an authoritar-
ian political regime. Th e role of the king was considered crucial in keeping 
the regime authoritarian and the political structure of the Kingdom fragile. 
Understanding the polity of the Kingdom is decisive for an indepth over-
view of its breakup, which is also the goal of this paper. A circle point is 
made around empirical data out of the Polity IV project, which investigates 
changes of the world polity forms from 1800 to 2010. 
Key words: Kingdom SHS/Yugoslavia, Aleksandar Karađorđević, Authori-
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Introduction 
When arguing about the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia, the majority of 
 historiographers have a balanced presentation. Th e Kingdom was a state, which 
began its life as a parliamentary monarchy, went through a harsh period of 
royal dictatorship under the king and ended in a renewed regime of parlia-
mentarism under regentship. Diff erences in historiographic presentations 
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arise from diverse interpretations of King Aleksandar Karađorđević’s role and 
the role of the surrounding state policy making apparatus. 
Yugoslav Marxist historiographic interpretation of the interwar period was 
entirely in the hands of the Communist Party.1 Th e dominant picture  presented 
the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia as the classic class battle between Serbian 
bourgeoisie and communist worker-peasant elements.2 Th e “national ques-
tion” wasn’t avoided, but because of the paradigm of “brotherhood and unity” 
it was subdued in order not to mention any existing national tensions.3 Within 
these historiographies, the most researched topic of the interwar period was 
the role of the Communist Party. Th ere existed a two-dimensional portrait of 
oppressed people and their slave drivers. Centralists like Stjepan Radić, the 
leader of the Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska Seljačka Stranka, hereaft er 
HSS), where placed in the same box as King Aleksandar.4 
By the breakup of the socialist Yugoslavia in 1990 each of the newly estab-
lished states had developed its own historiography. New interpretations of the 
interwar period appeared and were balanced with each state’s own experience.5 
Croatian historiography showed that the Kingdom SHS/Yugoslavia was a highly 
authoritarian state where King Aleksandar led an ultimate centralistic and uni-
taristic polity on a Serbian course. Th e reason for dissolving the Kingdom was 
the unresolved national question, which eventually burst under Greater Serbian 
pressure.6 On the other hand, Serbian historiography sees King Aleksandar as an 
1  Magdalena Najbar-Agičić, U skladu s marksizmom ili činjenicama? Hrvatska historiografi ja 
1945-1960 (Zagreb, 2013), p. 376.
2  See Ferdo Čulinović, Jugoslavija između dva rata, (Belgrade, 1967), Branko Petranović, Istori-
ja Jugoslavije 1918.-1988., vol. I, (Belgrade, 1988).
3  M. Najbar-Agičić, U skladu s marksizmom ili činjenicama?, p. 505. During the socialist period of 
Yugoslavia the interpretation of the interwar period changed slightly. Th is happened just aft er 1960 
when the terms like “national harassment” and “national question” appeared in history textbooks 
used in the Socialist Republic of Croatia. (Snježana Koren, Politika povijesti u Jugoslaviji (1946-
1960.). Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, nastava povijesti, historiografi ja (Zagreb, 2012), p. 305). In 
historiography Franjo Tuđman made an exception in 1967 naming the unresolving of the national 
question, i.e. the imposition of the “great Serbian hegemony” among the main reasons of the crisis 
in interwar Yugoslavia. (F. Tuđman, “Uzroci krize monarhističke Jugoslavije od ujedinjenja 1918. 
do sloma 1941.”, Forum, No. 1-2/1967, pp. 73-111, p. 73). Th e unacceptability of this and similar 
Tuđman’s writing (particularly with WWII subjects) is best seen in the fact that the same year he 
was expelled from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and retired from the position of a director 
of the Institute for the History of Workers’ Movement of Croatia in Zagreb.
4  Ferdo Čulinović, Jugoslavija između dva rata, p. 288. 
5  It is important to note that also during socialist Yugoslavia each republic had its own institu-
tions for the development of their own historiographies. Th us the term “Yugoslav historiogra-
phy” rather defi nes a group of individual republic historiographies which were developing 
within the same, Marxist framework. (Magdalena Najbar-Agičić, U skladu s marksizmom ili 
činjenicama?, pp. 248-263).
6  See Franjo Tuđman, Hrvatska u monarhističkoj Jugoslaviji, vol. I, II (Zagreb, 1993), Bosiljka 
Janjatović, Politički teror u Hrvatskoj 1918.-1935. (Zagreb, 2003).
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authoritarian character but surrounded by hostility and the destructive inten-
tions of non-Serb political forces. According to these researchers the purpose for 
dissolving the Kingdom lies in the hostility of the non-Serbian nations that from 
the beginning of the state had intentions to break it. However, there are multiple 
conclusions about the polity of the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia, and vary from 
centralist-unitaristic to liberal-democratic ones.7 
Between the two World wars Croatian society found itself developing 
within a state under the Serbian dynasty of Karađorđević. Offi  cially, the state 
was presented as a result of historical achievement and the desire of South 
Slavic nations for unity. Nevertheless, instead of equality throughout its exis-
tence the Kingdom was characterized by the hard authoritarity of the King’s 
court and the administration in Belgrade. By the 1921 the Constitution of the 
Kingdom represented a parliamentary monarchy, but instead it really was a 
hybrid of a modern and the old polity. It was a regime stopped between tradi-
tional absolutistic monarchy and the modernization. It was ancien régime.8 
Arguments of non-democratic processes in the new state existed from its 
early years.9 According to this judgment the Act of December 1 was a unilat-
eral move by the Serbian regent Aleksandar Karađorđević who was only 
 answering a wish declared by the members of the National Council of the State 
of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Although state polity was yet to be decided, 
simultaneously two major powers of interests were shown. One was of a Ser-
bian character fought for centralism of the state, the other of Croatian attempt 
to gain a federalist regime of the Kingdom. Th e policy structure of the King-
dom did reveal some democratic insignias (like the existence of Parliament, 
Constitution, Elections, demonstrations) but in its root totally opposite 
7  See Ivana Dobrivojević, Državna represija u doba diktature kralja Aleksandra (1929.-1934.) 
(Belgrade, 2006), Nikola Žutić, “Srbi i građanski liberalizam u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Sloven-
aca 1918.-1929”, Dijalog povjesničara/istoričara 4 (Hans-Georg Fleck, Igor Graovac eds.) (Za-
greb, 2001), pp. 341-358., “Antiliberalizam kod Srba u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1934.-1941.”, Dijalog 
povjesničara – istoričara 6 (Hans-Georg Fleck, Igor Graovac eds.) (Zagreb, 2002), pp. 229-246.
8  Tihomir Cipek states that the modernization of the Kingdom of SHS would necessarily have 
meant the creation of a national state, which would eventually have led to either a radical reor-
ganization of the state or its break-up. Any of the outcomes would also have meant the end of 
the rule of the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty. In order to mainatain the existing state of aff airs 
the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia therefore never developed into a modern state. (Tihomir Ci-
pek, “Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata, Slovenaca / Jugoslavija – ancien régime”, Dijalog povjesičara/
istoričara 2, (Igor Graovac, Hans-Georg Fleck eds.) (Zagreb, 2000): 291-305, 293). 
9  On 1 December 1918 Regent Aleksandar Karađorđević gave a positive reply to the Statement 
(Address) of the National Council from Zagreb and declared the unifi cation of the State of SHS 
with the Kingdom of Serbia, by which the Kingdom of SHS was created. However, the represen-
tatives of the National Council were at the time just the representatives of the most prominent 
political forces and individuals from the State of SHS. Th eir ad hoc delegation expressed their 
own wish to unify with the Kingdom of Serbia. (See more in Ljubomirka Krkljuš, “Pravna priro-
da dokumenata od 1. decembra 1918. godine o stvaranju Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca”, 
Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 2004 (Belgrade), No. 69-70: 97-117, 116).
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 elements were showing (like violating the Constitutional rights, authoritarian 
regime, political repression or police surveillance).
In this paper I argue about the polity characteristics of the Kingdom of SHS/
Yugoslavia through several questions. Th e basic hypothesis is that the faith of the 
Kingdom was connected with the faith or King Aleksandar’s personality. I will 
attept to show this through examples. Whereas the basis of a state representation 
is its constitution, the characteristic of the regime can be seen out of its practical 
use. In this paper I aim to analyze the Constitutional promises and its practical 
enforcement in order to determine whether the Constitution was obeyed or not 
by the authorities. In a highly centralized state like the Kingdom of SHS/Yugo-
slavia, the elites in power preserved their position by using a repressive system.10 
In the last part of the paper, and on the basis of data from the Polity IV Project, 
the polity of the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia will be correlationed with the 
 regime values of the surrounding states.11
Reign of King Aleksandar Karađorđević
Th e political life and development of the Kingdom were under the crucial 
impact of King Aleksandar whose character was mostly shaped by his educa-
tion and active military service. Since he was seventeen his education was con-
tinued within the Tzarist military school of Saint Petersburg.12 During his 
early twenties he took part in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and aft er was 
 engaged in the First World War (hereaft er WWI) 1914-1918. Th at engagement 
made him a solid reputation both within the army and the Serbian people. Th e 
years of comradeship and living with soldiers made a future impact on Alek-
sandar to consider the Serbian army as his ultimate root and support. 
His military career wasn’t such a curiosity, since in the Kingdom of Serbia 
army service was considered even more important the diplomatic one.13 Th e 
military coup element was imminent within Serbia since 1868 (and the assas-
10  From 1929 to 1935 was the period of King Aleksandar Karađorđević’s personal dictatorship. 
Th en all political parties, the parliament and the constitution were abolished (until 1931).  
11  Th e Polity Project was initiated by Robert Gurr in 1972. Based on equal criteria, the aim was 
to obtain comparative results on the character of state regimes worldwide for analytical pur-
poses. Th e analysis provided comparative quantitative data on the characteristics of political 
regimes and their changes from 1800 to 2010. Until now four upgrades of the original project 
have been made, while the created database has become the most frequently quoted sourse in 
researching social regimes. In this paper I am using the latest version of data called Polity IV 
from 2010. (www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, access gained in August 2013)
12  Aleksandar joined the military service at the age of fi ft een when he became a soldier in the 
1st brigade 3rd battalion 6th Infantry Regiment (Branislav Gligorijević, Kralj Aleksandar I. 
Karađorđević (Belgrade, 1996), pp. 26-27).
13  Ibid., p. 27.
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sination of Mihailo Obrenović) but especially since 1903 when a group of 
Court army offi  cers violently dethroned the Obrenović dynasty by killing King 
Aleksandar and Queen Draga. By introducing military persons into the politi-
cal arena the fear of death ruled the relations between the governing and  people 
of swords.14 Th e Salonica Trial in 1917 when the leader of the 1903 military 
coup offi  cers Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis was facing death because of the 
 alleged conspiracy against Regent Aleksandar Karađorđević made Aleksandar 
even more bound tp his closest offi  cers.15 
Th is wasn’t a reality in the Croatian territories within the Austro-Hungar-
ian Monarchy. Th e political climate was much calmer and the politicians fought 
their battles through dialogue (although it truly was more like a noise of mono-
logues). Th ese diff erences, including the general absence of Croatian state-
hood, were the reasons why Serbian institutions expanded their infl uence over 
Croatian ones so successfully.16 Of course, one of the reasons for such a devel-
opment was that Serbia was a state long before 1918 with all its insignia and 
Croatia (Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia) was a part of a multina-
tional monarchy in which its own statehood was quite suppressed.17
Th e bond between King Aleksandar and his army wasn’t disjointed when the 
new state was formed. However, during the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia a 
 monarchial reign and a role of the military marked its existence. Th is reality of 
Yugoslav society was described by Svetozar Pribićević, an old king’s supporter 
but still a political prisoner from 1929, who in his memoirs wrote: “King keeps 
14  “(…) one must choose between killing or being killed” was an assessment of a Serbian lawyer 
and historian Slobodan Jovanović (1869-1958.) when describing Serbian political life before 
1918 (Ivo Banac, Th e National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, NY, 
1988), p. 113).
15  For more about the Salonica Procces see: Milan Ž. Živanović, Pukovnik Apis-hiljadu devesto 
sedamnaeste (Belgrade, 1955), Vasa Kazimirović, Crna ruka, (Kragujevac, 1997).
16  Ivo Banac, Th e National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 142.
17  Ibid., 113. Because of the reasons mentioned, there is an opinion in the literature that the uni-
fi cation of the State of SHS with the Kingdom of Serbia in 1918 led to an overlap of two worlds, or 
rather the clash of two cultures, the Austro-Hungarian and the Balkan ones. In 1988, Branko 
Petranović named those reasons as a signifi cant factor and cause of problems in the interwar Yu-
goslavia. (Branko Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1914.-1988., vol. I (Belgrade, s.a.), pp. 53-56). 
Later in the book Jugoslovensko iskustvo srpske nacionalne integracije (Belgrade,1993), p. 16) 
Branko Petranović claimed that exactly limited parliamentarism between 1921 and 1929 was “the 
greatest value” of the interwar Yugoslavia. (Mira Radojević, “On the problem of Democracy and 
Parliamentarism in Yugoslavia between the Two World Wars”, Istorijski zapisi. Organ Istorijskog 
instituta i Društva istoričara Crne Gore, LXXXV, No. 3-4 (2012): 99-110, 108). In recent Serbian 
historiography one can notice diff erent opinions. Ivana Dobrivojević puts the idea of the overlap-
ping of the two worlds into “demagogic slogans”. (I. Dobrivojević, Državna represija u doba diktat-
ure, p. 343). Mira Radojević refutes the theses stating that it was exactly in Serbia where democ-
racy and the related worldview had been present from as early as 1913, which cannot be claimed 
for the former Austro-Hungarian territories. (M. Radivojević, “On the problem of Democracy and 
Parliamentarism in Yugoslavia between the Two World Wars”, p. 100).
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in his hands the whole power and governs the state politics; only his will is 
 happening and behind him nothing can happen”.18 It was visible that an authori-
tarian rule was Aleksandar’s fi rst choice. However, in the end this path was more 
likely the normal behavior of his contemporary monarch colleagues.19 
His tendency to authoritarian governance was visible even from the fi rst 
days of the Kingdom when in the beginning of December 1918 Aleksandar 
refused to sign the nomination of the fi rst Yugoslav government only because 
the proposed president was Nikola Pašić.20 By this act it was clear that the 
 regent and future king would not hesitate to put his personal interests before 
the state ones.21 His vision of governance was introducing his personal rule 
without so many intermediaries. Th is tendency was becoming more visible 
aft er he took the crown in 1921. Th e idea was turned into a reality in the begin-
ning of January 1929 aft er which a harsh period of the King’s dictatorship and 
authoritarian regime began and lasted for almost six years when he was assas-
sinated. Introducing dictatorship wasn’t a product of the moment but the King 
had thought about it long before 1929. 
Th e King controlled and directed the work of the government from the 
fi rst days and even had an instrument inside the government for such a posi-
tion. Th e key was the Minister of the Army and the Navy, an all King’s man 
who was the one and only minister appointed directly by him. Th roughout the 
existence of the Kingdom the position of the Minister of the Army and Navy 
was held by military offi  cers. Th e king’s willingness for a dictatorship (before 
1929) was the most vivid during 1924 when the government of Ljubomir 
Davidović (Democratic Party, July 28, 1924 – November 6, 1924.) fell because 
of the Minister of Army and Navy General Hadžić’s resignation.22 General 
18  Svetozar Pribićević, Diktatura kralja Aleksandra, (Zagreb, 1990), p. 82.
19  Zogu, the King of Albania, Karol II, the King of Romania and Boris III, the emperor of Bul-
garia had a similar education with an ingrained loyalty towards the army and the authoritarian 
behavior (characteristic for the 19th century) (Balkanski diktatori. Diktatori i autoritarni vladari 
jugoistočne Europe (Bernd J. Fišer ed.), (Belgrade, 2009).
20  Th ere is an opinion in literature that Nikola Pašić was removed from leadership position 
because he advocated the idea of unifi cation on the idea of “Great Serbia”, as opposed to Regent 
Aleksandar’s idea of equal unifi cation of the Kingdom of Serbia with the State of SHS: (See Gor-
dana Krivokapić – Jović, “Nikola Pašić 1918-1926: Kraj jedne karijere”, Tokovi istorije (2011), 
No. 1: 37, 32-45). However, according to the testimony of Svetozar Pribičević, the reason was of 
a personal nature. Th e Regent couldn’t accept Nikola Pašić because “Pašić told the leaders of the 
Serbian opposition that the government couldn’t accept the Geneva Pact because he, the Regent, 
was against.” (S. Pribićević, Diktatura, p. 91.). 
21  Th e negotiations on the members of the fi rst government of the Kingdom of SHS began on 
27 November 1918 between the representatives of the National Council of the State of SHS and 
the Serbian political parties.Th e negotiations were presided over by Nikola Pašić. 
22  On the political crisis in 1924 see in: Branislav Gligorijević, “Uloga vojnih krugova u 
“rešavanju” političke krize u Jugoslaviji 1924. godine”, Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 23 (1972), No. 1: 
161-186.
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Hadžić’s resignation was clearly a result of the king’s command and was deliv-
ered to him before the President of the Government knew about it. Aft er this 
the King’s pressure on Davidović to resign was enforced by a group of military 
offi  cers who threatened even by coup d’Etat in order to bring Radical Nikola 
Pašić in power. Aft er few months of keeping his position Ljubomir Davidović 
fi nally withdrew on October 15, 1924 with signifi cant words “Whereas Your 
Majesty gave his voice to me to resign in a matter of expanding the base of our 
policy of peace, order, law, fi ght against corruption and fi nal agreement  between 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, I feel free to give You a resignation of my Cabinet”. 
23 Th e Government of Nikola Pašić (Peoples Radical Party, November 6, 
1924-April 8, 1925) took power just like the king wanted aft er all. 
Th e King’s intentions of introducing dictatorship were seen by foreign diplo-
mats in the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia, too. In that way an interesting fact is 
that in October 1927 a staff  member of the Greek Legation in the Kingdom told 
the U.S. Legate John Dyneley Prince that “the Yugoslavs are living under a very 
thinly veiled autocracy”.24 On the other hand, thinking that dictatorship could be 
welcomed by the Yugoslav people was common among domestic notability. 
During one reception at General Milivoj Zečević’s house in Skoplje (Macedonia) 
in October 1927 the General and Head of the Serbian Orthodox Church Metro-
politan Varnava (Petar Rosić) said to J. D. Prince that what Yugoslavia really 
needs is one benevolent dictatorship. What’s more, the U.S. Legate informed the 
U.S. Secretary of State that general opinion at the reception was that “only salva-
tion of the country must come from a military fascism, strictly but benevolently 
applied (…)”.25 It was clear that the support of the King and his army was mutual. 
According to J. D. Prince that kind of dictatorship would really have been wel-
comed by the majority of the Yugoslav population.26 
King Aleksandar fi nally fulfi lled his wish for dictatorship in the beginning 
of 1929. Th e King offi  cially explained the reasons for his decision in an address 
named “To my people”. In order to make an even greater impact on the people 
the King promised suppression of corruption and economic revival. Instead, 
the Parliament was dismissed, political parties were banned and the Constitu-
tion was suppressed. Above all a military person, general Petar Živković 
23  Ibid., 181.
24  Report of the U.S. Legate in Belgrade J. D. Prince to the Secretary of the State in Washington, 
D.C. from October 26, 1927, National Archives Microfi lm Publication, Microfi lm Publication M 
358, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Aff airs of Yugoslavia 1910-1929, 
Decimal File 860h, Roll 4, Document No. 860h.00/331 (hereaft er: NARA, M 358, Roll No., Doc-
ument No.). J. D. Prince was U.S. Legate to the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia from 1926 to 1933. 
Before that was a Minister Plenipotentiary to Dennmark. By profession he was a linguist.
25  Report of J. D. Prince to the Secretary of State from October 21, 1927, NARA, M 358, Roll 4, 
860h.00/329.
26  Report of J. D. Prince to the Secretary of State from October 26, 1927, NARA, M 358, Roll 4, 
document No. 860h.00/331.
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 became the President of the Cabinet and the Minister of the Interior.27 Simul-
taneously, new laws were introduced with the aim only to ensure the King’s 
unlimited power. Th e most important of these was “Th e Law of King’s reign 
and the supreme state administration” which confi rmed the king’s exclusive 
position as the Yugoslavian superior. Th is law especially defi ned that “king 
holds all the governing authority in the country. Th e King is delivering and 
pronouncing the laws, he appoints the state servants and gives the ranks to 
military persons (Article 2) (...) the King gives amnesty for every off ence (…) 
the King gives pardons. He can forgive, shorten or ease the condemned penal-
ties (Article 3) (...) King’s person is sacrosanct. Th e King could not be held 
personally liable for or accused of anything (Article 6).”28 
Unlike that of the regime that was introduced at home it was important to 
King Aleksandar to establish a brighter show of his behavior to the allies 
abroad. Th at could be the reason for his trip to Paris just before introducing 
the dictatorship. By understanding the traditional repulsion of the western 
style democracies (mostly France and Czechoslovakia) to the authoritarian 
 regimes and being aware of the need for their fi nancial support in the same 
time King Aleksandar promised that his dictatorship would last only for a year. 
According to the Czechoslovak Legation in Tirana, Leon Vokač, Czechoslova-
kian Minister of Foreign Aff airs at the time, Edward Beneš told him person-
ally that, “King Alexander promised him (to Edward Beneš, author’s comment) 
that it would be maintained for one year only. I understand that France also 
knew about this promise.”29 Facing one of the “Little Entant” members with 
dictatorship was in no way wasn’t acceptable to him.30 During the same con-
versation Leon Vokač told to the U.S. Legate in Tirana, Herman Bernstein, that 
“the methods employed by the Yugoslav Government in dealing with the 
 opposition are ruthless. Most of the leaders of the opposition have been removed 
either by assassination or by imprisonment. Such things are not done in civilized 
states. I have told them in Belgrade on several occasions, but they  answered that 
dangerous people must be kept where they could do no harm.“31 
Opposite to his promises abroad King Aleksandar made the state repres-
sive system sharper and even more solid at home. He became satisfi ed with the 
27  “Mome dragom narodu. Svima Srbima, Hrvatima i Slovencima”, Politika (Beograd), January 
6, 1929, No. 7430, p. 1.
28  “Zakon o kraljevskoj vlasti i vrhovnoj državnoj upravi”, Službene novine Kraljevine SHS, 
11January 1929
29  Report of the U.S. Legate in Tirana Herman Bernstain to the Secretary of State from April 22, 
1931, NARA, M 1203, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Aff airs of Yugo-
slavia 1930-1944, Roll 1, Document No. 860.00h/480.
30  (Ibid.). Th e Little Entente was a military alliance between the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia, 
the Republic of Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Romania between 1920 and 1928. It was 
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repressive apparatus only during the dictatorship. He confi rmed that in one of 
his audiences with U.S. Legate J. D. Prince in the beginning of March 1930 
when he stated: “the internal situation remains just as it has been since the 
beginning of my dictatorship. While there is some discontent in Croatia, it is 
so successfully hidden that even my own secret service fi nds it diffi  cult to  locate 
it but as long as it is there, it may be a source of danger to the peace of the com-
munity and, therefore, we have to be constantly on guard.”32 
J. D. Prince reported to the State Department that in every single one of his 
conversations with King Aleksandar the King would underscore the point that 
he would never abdicate centralization. Th is led J. D. Prince to the conclusion 
that all about federalization of the state and liberalization of politics was in 
vain.33 During these talks the King never liked hearing the names Croat, Dal-
matian, Montenegrin or Slovene. According to J. D. Prince the King’s “idea 
now is quite patently that the whole place must become a “Greater Serbia” and 
he is quite prepared to risk even his Crown and perhaps his life in order to 
 attain this.”34 Due to this, in one of his last reports on the position of the U.S. 
Legate in Belgrade J. D. Prince concluded about the King: “He is far from being 
a bad man, nor is he naturally cruel. He has only one idea in mind – the pres-
ervation of the integrity of his state so that he may hand it over to his succes-
sors when his days are over in as nearly as possible the same condition territo-
rially as it is now. He therefore closes his eyes deliberately to a thousand injus-
tices which are almost daily being enacted upon the opposition. His idea of 
opposition is to kill it, not to temporize with it. In this, of course, he is thor-
oughly Serb, for which one cannot blame him, as all his blood and traditions 
are Serb. Th ere can be no doubt that he is a great ruler and that he is person-
ally a most charming man. His fault is – naturally Serbian one – that he is 
perfectly indiff erent, like all his fellow tribesmen, to the opinion of any out-
sider. No Serb really cares what any foreigner, even a Frenchman, thinks of his 
personality, his life and his methods (...)”.35
Aft er eight years of service in the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia during 1933, 
in one of his last reports to the Secretary of State J. D. Prince wrote a confi den-
tial study about race characteristics of Yugoslav people. It was deprived of 
 certain historical fundamentals but, on the other hand was enriched with his 
personal experience of the state, which represented no special interest to his 
homeland. His frankness and lack of political sensitivity makes this report in-
teresting for analysis, commentary, and extensive quoting. In this report J. D. 
32  Report of J. D. Prince to the Secretary of State from March 8, 1930, NARA, M 1203, Roll 1, 
Document No. 860h.00/437.
33  Report of J. D. Prince to the Secretary of State from February 1, 1933, NARA, M 1203, Roll 1, 
Document No. 860h.00/610. 
34  Ibid.
35  Report of J. D. Prince to the Secretary of State from August 25, 1933, NARA, M 1203, Roll 2, 
Document No. 860h.00/651.
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Prince connected the personality of King Aleksandar with the faith in a unifi ed 
Yugoslavia and also expressed his opinion that the creation of a unique Yugo-
slavia simply wasn’t possible.36 Th e reasons for him were that the Croats, Serbs 
and Slovenes were in fact very diff erent. He considered Croats the purest Slavs 
and compared them with Poles. Slovenes were Germanized Slavs who accepted 
German mentality and habits. On Serbs he wrote – “I have no hesitation that 
in my opinion the Serb is not of Slavic origin at all, except of course in lan-
guage, nor has he been for the last six hundred years. In fact, the non-Slavic 
temperament of the Serb, who desires and is at present acquiring domination 
over his Croat, Dalmatian and Slovene nationalists, is the fundamental, in my 
opinion, for the lack of the success with which the Belgrade Serb Government 
has met in its endeavor to unify the present heterogeneous Yugoslavia (…) Th e 
Serb has been governed by force, and successfully so far as his former rules are 
concerned, and he is going to continue governing his supposed fellow nation-
als in the same way, reducing them to his will and to his will only (…) Th e Serb 
is dull-witted and, like most dull-witted people, excessively obstinate, which 
quality carries with it an inevitable arrogance. He cannot think that any other 
tribe that his own is worthy of much consideration. He looks down on his 
Croat neighbors as “fl ighty and idealists”; upon his Slovene nationalists as un-
Slavonic “cattle”, and upon all other surrounding people as highly inferior to 
himself in every way. He ignores the Anglo-Saxons as completely as if they 
were being of another world.”37 Th e leader of the integral Yugoslav idea, King 
Aleksandar was seen as “a Serb of the Serbs, who wishes to bring about a unit-
ed Kingdom; but, when he thinks of Yugoslavia, he is bound by his training 
and the narrowness of his horizon to think only of an extended Serbia (…) His 
idea of government he got in old Russia, where he spent several years at school 
at the Court, and he has never been able, owing to his Serbian temperament, to 
depart very far from the horizon of his childhood.”38
Th e Civil Freedoms and the Constitutional Promises 
In theory, the willingness of the state to respect civil freedoms can be seen 
within the Constitution’s text. Th at fundamental law shapes the polity of a state 
and subsequently has incorporated articles dealing with people’s rights. How-
ever, these articles could be obeyed or be harshly violated by the state authori-
ties. Whatsoever, mentioning of specifi c human rights in the body of the Con-
stitution can mean two things. Th e fi rst is that state authorities are sensitive to 
them in name only and will intentionally break them. Th e second interpreta-
tion holds that these values are considered fundamental and that the state will 
36  Report of J. D. Prince to the Secretary of Statefrom March 8, 1933, M 1203, Roll 10, Docu-
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do everything in power to cherish them. Parallel to these theories there exists 
a third one, which considers Constitutional promises as a minor element in 
understanding the polity of a state.39 
I argue that the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia fi ts the fi rst hypothesis. Th e 
Kingdom of SHS received its fi rst Constitution only in 1921, aft er two and a 
half years of governing by state decrees and acts.40 Th is Constitution was basi-
cally a copy of the old Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbia from 1903. Like 
that one, the new Yugoslavian Constitution had also incorporated articles of 
basic freedoms of democracy and cherished such values. According to acces-
sible sources and research it is impossible to demonstrate any empirical data 
on the breaking constitutional promises of human rights.41 Consequently, I 
will demonstrate the breaking of constitutional promises of the Kingdom of 
SHS/Yugoslavia with a number of “real-life” examples.
Constitutional articles on human rights were precise and concise. It was 
clearly written that all citizens are equal by the law and that all are protected by 
the state (Article 4) enjoying their personal freedom (Article 5). It was prom-
ised that no one can be tried by a non-competent court (Article 6) and that no 
one could be sentenced without a hearing or a proper opportunity for defend-
ing themselves (Article 7). One could be sentenced just for felonies proscribed 
by the law (Article 8), the death penalty couldn’t be pronounced over political 
felony (Article 9).42 Th e Constitution promised all citizens freedom of intarna-
tion, i.e. forced transfer or deportation only for those who are not sentenced to 
such (Article 10). Inviolability of households was also promised and authori-
ties were not allowed to do an inquest without a proper warrant.43
39  Christian A. Davenport, “Constitutional promises“ and Repressive Reality: A Cross National 
Time-Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties are Supressed“, Th e Journal of 
Politics, vol. 58, No. 3 (Aug., 1996), 627 – 654, 630-633.
40  Th e constitution was adopted on 28 June 1921 on the Orthodox Church festival called St. 
Vitus Day (Vidovdan), hence it is known in historiography as the Vidovdan Constitution. 
41  Th e empirical research of the constitutionally promised freedoms and their implementation 
for gaining comparative data on the levels of “negative sanctions” (censorship and political re-
strictions) uses the handbook by Charles Taylor and David Joyce (World Handbook of Political 
and Social Indicators III, (New Heaven, 1983) which covers the data of the states only between 
1948 and 1982, for which reason it cannot be used in this paper. 
42  Th e exceptions were the assassins of the royal family members and other perpetrators who, 
besides political, committed another crime for which civil or military laws prescribed death 
penalty. (Ustav Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Belgrade, 1921), Article 9).
43  Ibid, article 11. Th e home search was described in detail in the Constitution. It could have 
been conducted only in the presence of two witnesses. In case of a night search preferably a 
municipal leader should have been present. Prior to the search the citizen received the written 
decision of the investigating body. He had the right to appeal, which did not delay the search. 
Aft er the search the citizen was given the list of items confi scated for the purpose of investiga-
tion. A night search could be conducted only in dire need.
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Th e Constitution promised equality for all acknowledged religions but re-
ligious belief could not be used as a reason for avoiding civil or military duties. 
Attending mass in churches was not compulsory except on state holidays. 
Freedom of the press was promised with the addition that no measures were 
allowed that could inhibit publishing, selling or distributing of newspapers 
(Article 13). By the Constitution, censorship could be established only in two 
cases, during war and mobilization. Citizens had the right to unite and gather 
although the Constitution pronounced that strict conditions of this right 
would be defi ned by another law (Article 14). Also, citizens had the right of 
writing to every government instance (Article 15). Privacy of letters, phone 
conversations and telegrams were guaranteed excluding the case of war, mobi-
lization or offi  cial investigation (Article 17).
Th e text of the Constitution also made clear what the state wouldn not toler-
ate. Th ese were insults of the Th rone or the Royal family members, insulting 
foreign heads of states or Parliament and calling for a change of Constitution and 
laws by force.44 Th e Constitution existed for eight years. By introducing the dic-
tatorship it was abolished and the Kingdom faced an unconstitutional vacuum 
during which one of the worst repressions of the state occured. Under intense 
pressure from abroad the King re-imposed constitutional rule two years later. 
Th is new Constitution diff ered from the old one only in the articles relating to 
civil rights. Th is fact supports the hypothesis authorities more easily violate cer-
tain basic rights when they are never mentioned constitutionally. 
Under the new Constitution all citizens were equal. Th is was warranted by 
Article 5. Unlike the Vidovdan Constitution, the new one had a vividly shorter 
text where civil liberties were described. It was guaranteed that no one could 
be deprived of their freedom but with exception of the cases arranged by law. 
Included in this new constitution was an article stating that no one could be 
tried by an unauthorized court was. Th ere still existed determinations about 
not being sentenced without proper defense, of being tried only for legally-
described off ences. Th e Constitution of 1931 still contained an article about 
integrity of the living space (Article 10). However the Article’s text was much 
shorter then in 1921 and simply guaranteed that the authorities could perform 
searchs only in cases arranged by law. Article 11 concerning the equality of 
religions was the same with addition of the assertion that during religious 
gathering no political agitation was allowed.45 Th is additional sentence reveals 
the great sensitivity of the state towards political opposition at the time.
As opposed to the Constitution of 1921 the freedom of the press, interest-
ingly wasn’t guaranteed. Instead, the Constitution of 1931 camoufl aged this 
44  In the case of such temporary ban the authorities had to submit the case to the court within 
24 hours. Th e court had 24 hours to either enforce or cancel it. In case the decision wasn’t made 
within 48 hours the ban was deemed cancelled. 
45  Ustav Kraljevine Jugoslavije (Constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), (Belgrade, 1931), 
Article 11.
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guarantee by saying that everyone is allowed to express their opinion, but only 
within the legal boundaries (Article 12).46 Th is radical change of the polity was 
vividly showed in the Article 12 considering rights for alliances. Th e Article 
regulated that everyone is allowed to mutual affi  liate but in legally arranged 
cases only. Simultaneously, it was forbidden by the same article for anyone to 
affi  liate on the basis of religion, rationality or nationality.47 It’s interesting that 
the article about the privacy of letters and phone conversations survived.48 Th e 
last piece of the dictatorship puzzle was made by introducing the army to the 
political arena. With Article 112 the Constitutional right for asking the mili-
tary support was given to the executive civilian authorities which basically 
promoted the army to police forces.49 
Th e Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia had the Constitution(s), but in certain 
articles considering the civil liberties it was clearly shown that those rights 
could be violated by another law. According to that intention it’s more likely 
that the mentioning of citizen rights in the Constitution was much more a 
“Constitution at threat” than a “Constitutional promise”. Besides Constitution-
al guarantees the violation of those was common in interwar Yugoslavia. Citi-
zens were constantly jailed without trials, interned, or they experienced un-
constitutional searches. A law which can be described as a supraconstitution 
law was the Law of defending public security and the system of the state. Passed 
in 1921 this law proscribed the death penalty for a political off ence even though 
the Constitution banned such a sentence. Under pretence of protecting the 
national security human rights were violated because of political reasons. An 
example of a police investigation common to a dictatorship period was de-
scribed in the Parliament in 1932 by Mirko Komnenović, a Minister for Social 
Politics and Public Health as follows:
 “Methods of investigation can be divided in three levels. First, the suspect 
is brought in a state of psychosis by intimidation. About ten people, most-
ly aft er midnight, intrude the suspect’s living place, oft en through win-
dows, with their revolvers drawn. Th ey chain the suspect and start harass-
ing him on the way to the police station. From the moment he enters its 
doorstep (…) his life is completely in the hands of the police. Th e fi rst 
words to the stiff  suspect are commonly a curse accompanied by harsh 
kicks of the fi sts and legs (....).”50
46  Ibid., Article 12.
47  Ibid., Article 13.
48  Ibid., Article 17.
49  Ibid., Article 112.
50  Th e Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade (hereaft er: AJ), Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova (Fund 
Ministry of the Interior) (14), Report “Kako je policija postupala sa uhapšenim studentima” in 
addition to interpelation of M. Komnenović to the Minister of the Physical Health and pre-
sented to Dr. Milan Stojadinović, President of the Ministerial Council, 24– 294.
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When arguing the freedom of the press in the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia 
much becomes clearer in light of the fact that the Ministry of the Interior from 
1920 had a special department for monitoring all domestic newspapers, the 
Presbiro. In 1929 Presbiro became Centralni Presbiro (Central Pressburo, he-
reaft er CPB) and monitored also newspapers abroad, which made the CPB an 
Intelligence Service department. In addition, department(s) had a mission to 
supervise and monitor coverings of the radio at home and abroad. Also, CPB 
was used by the state to impose additional pressure over newspaper or radio 
editorials to write on their behalf. CPB had agents and correspondent offi  ces 
across the Kingdom and in most important European and World metropoli-
ses. In cases when authorities were dissatisfi ed with what was written, a mee-
ting between state local representatives, police and CPB correspondents would 
be held. Th e goal of these meetings were how to discipline the media and order 
them to “improve” their writing. 
Th e Banus of the Primorska Banovina, Dr. Josip Jablanović, reported to the 
President of the government Milan Stojadinović about one such meeting on 
April 7, 1938. Th e Banus explained to Stojadinović that he held a conference 
with the state attorney, chief of police and CPB correspondents to “discipline 
the local press” and concluded that the result of their measures could already 
be seen.51 Above this, additional pressure on every opposition newspapers was 
eminent. Th e editorials were under surveillance, distribution was obstructed, 
issues were banned, and all in the service of guarding a centralistic unitaristic 
regime of power. During the dictatorship censorship became so sharp that 
some events managed to stay secret even to the people living nearby.52 
Th e Constitution of 1921 strengthened the centralistic polity of the King-
dom as well as the position of the king. All mentioned civil rights were soon 
aft er bespread by the Law of protection of public safety and organization in the 
state. In reality this law became important as the fundamental law. Proof that 
the Constitution in reality meant very little was given in 1929 when the King 
abolished it. It could be said that the role of the Constitution in the Kingdom 
was simply of decoration need.53 Th e above mentioned examples of violations 
of the Constitution represented the people’s everyday living. For the people 
who were outside the protected regime’s loyal class, that living was fi lled with 
constant fear, violence and suppression. Society, which was oppressed with a 
number of problems, from economical to nationalist ones, found itself dug 
into a hollow of two kinds. Th ese two consisted of those with the Belgrade re-
gime of centralistic tendency and those who were against it. In this collision 
what most marked the everyday life of the Kingdom SHS/Yugoslavia 1918-
1941 undoubtedly were varieties of the state repression.
51  AJ 37, Zbirka Milana Stojadinovića (Milan Stojadinović Collection), 49-447.
52  Report of U.S. Consul in Zagreb Egmont C. von Tresckov to J. D. Prince from August 11, 
1932, NARA, M 1203, Roll 1, Document No. 860h.00/582.
53  I. Dobrivojević, Državna represija u doba diktature, p. 60.
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Repression in Political Life of the Kingdom SHS/Yugoslavia
In 1933 when U.S. Legate J. D. Prince was explaining why Yugoslavia still 
held, he concluded: “Yugoslavia is held by a double fear: fi rst, of “all the King’s 
horses and all the King’s men”, and second, of what might happen at present if 
an internal scission were to take place.”54 Th roughout the existence of the King-
dom of SHS/Yugoslavia two battles were fought, one for centralism and one for 
the anticentralistic polity. King Aleksandar Karađorđević was the key role in 
keeping the authoritarian polity in power, which lasted throughout his life. 
Ultimate authoritarianism and autocracy lasted from 1929 till 1937 when un-
der the government of Milan Stojadinović and the regentship, led by Prince 
Pavle Karađorđević, some traces of democratization could be seen. 
An insuperable barrier to more democratic development of the Kingdom 
was set already at the beginning of new state and was indicated by the suprem-
acy of the Serbian prefi x. It was a result of the widely spread opinion at the time 
that Serbian statehood must not be drowned in the new state.55 Th is idea was 
not changed even when the king completely turned his devotion to making an 
integral Yugoslav people. During one conversation with U.S. Legate J. D. Prince 
in 1931 former Legate of the Kingdom of SHS in Washington, D.C. (1918-
1922) Slavko Grujić told an interesting statement of King Aleksandar and his 
present regime: “I am opposed to all this Yugoslav nonsense. Th e country 
MUST be Greater Serbia and the Serb alone must dominate. Th at was the in-
tention of having Karageorgevich as King.”56
A leading part in polity making, besides the king there were two major po-
litical parties of Serbian auspice: Radicals (Peoples Radical Party) and their op-
ponents Democrats (Democratic Party). Among Radicals two fractions existed, 
one around Nikola Pašić and the other of Stojan Protić. Nikola Pašić advocated 
the autocratic Russian polity making while Stojan Protić was much for more re-
strained centralism along a British model.57 Eventually Stojan Protić became a 
party dissident aft er realizing how harsh was the developing centralism. As well 
as seeing what hard repression was doing to Serbian democratic ideas.58 
Th e Democratic Party also wasn’t immune to fractionism. For example, 
Svetozar Pribićević left  the Democrats and organized a new party, Th e Inde-
54  Report of John D. Prince to the State Secretary from August 25, 1933. NARA, M 1203, Roll 
2, Document No. 860H.00/651.
55  I. Banac, Th e National Question in Yugoslavia, pp. 162-163; Pieter Troch, “Yugoslavism Be-
tween Two World Wars: indecisive Nation building”, Nationalities Papers: Th e Journal of Nation-
alism and Ethnicity, 38 (2010), No. 2: 227-244, 228.
56  Report of J. D. Prince to the Secretary of State from July 14, 1931. NARA, M 1203, Roll 1, 
Document No. 860h.00/498. 
57  I. Banac, Th e National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 168.
58  Ibid, 136.
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pendent Democratic Party (Samostalna demokratska stranka). His main goal 
was an eager fi ght for a unitaristic state organization.59 Intolerance to everyone 
who were not behind the IDP program IDP was expressed in a furiously. IDP 
had authoritarian characteristics of which the proof was the organizing of its 
combat squads, the Organization of the Yugoslav Nationalists (ORJUNA). 
ORJUNA had a mission to bowl over every one proclaimed by them as state 
enemy. Th ese squads founded in 1921 immediately became a helping force to 
the gendarmerie and police. During this time Svetozar Pribićević, the leader of 
IDP held the offi  ce of the Minister of Interior.60 Beside these units IDP dis-
posed of some other forces with paramilitary characteristics. For example, in a 
juxtaposition to the Stjepan Radić’s infl uence in Banovina, Svetozar Pribićević’s 
brother Milan Pribićević organized some 15 000 Serbian people there.61  Besides 
the organized units of ORJUNA and its great infl uence among Croatian Serbs, 
IDP had pretention to the people from the army. Th is fact pushed the Party 
into additional confl ict with the Radical Party, which had the same intention. 
Th e problem burst when IDP entered the traditionally Radical base, among the 
Salonica volunteers and Chetniks who both enjoyed privileged position in the 
new state. Th is quiet war smoldered for years and most visible traces of it was 
their mutual fi ght for the infl uence over the Ministry of Interior during which 
members of the Chetnik organization also were helping force into being a state 
repressive apparatus.
By 1929 the Kingdom of SHS had twenty-four governments. During this 
period the position of the Minister of Interior served fourteen people through 
eighteen mandates. Th e position was held the most (seven times) by Božidar 
Maksimović known also as the Stock (Radical Party). Four times the position 
was held by Svetozar Pribićević (Democratic Party), three times by Milorad 
Drašković (Democratic Party) while Milorad Vujičić (DP), Milan Srškić (RP) 
and Anton Korošec (Slovenian Peoples Party) were ministers for two times 
each. However, only one man remained in the offi  ce for more than two and a 
half years, Svetozar Pribićević who also was the fi rst in the position of the Min-
ister of Interior. 
Th e U.S. Legate to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia J. D. Prince once wrote to the 
Secretary of the state that two things are keeping the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
alive. First was the fear of the king’s troopers and the second one was fear of Ital-
ian pretensions.62 Certainly, autocratic and totalitarian regimes are much relying 
59  More on the beginnings of Democratic Party see in: Branislav Gligorijević, Istorija 
Demokratske stranke: 1919-1928, (Belgrade, 2009).
60  More on ORJUNA see in: B. Gligorijević, “Organizacija jugoslovenskih nacionalista (Orju-
na)”, Istorija XX veka. Zbornik radova V, Beograd 1963, 315.-396, Stevo Đurašković, “Ideologija 
Organizacije jugoslavenskih nacionalista (ORJUNA)”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 43 (2011), 
No. 1: 225-249.
61  I. Banac, Th e National Question in Yugoslavia, p. 187.
62  Report of John D. Prince to the State Secreatry from August 25, 1933. NARA, M 1203, Roll 
2, Document No. 860H.00/651.
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on the power of the state repressive system and such was the case with the King-
dom of Yugoslavia. Most of the budget was allocated for the Ministry of the 
Army and Navy and the Ministry of Interior. Th is statement is confi rmed by the 
number of state offi  cials and employees. For example, in 1931 out of all state of-
fi cials there was 17, 82 % of those working for the Ministry of Interior. Only a year 
later their portion increased to 20, 44 %, while the percentage of the active offi  cers 
and soldiers was a total of 28,05 %. Th ese indicators continued in the years that 
followed, so that the number of uniforms (both from the Ministry of Interior and 
the Ministry of Army and Navy) made around half of complete state employees. 
Data of the state budget from the era of dictatorship reveals how the re-
gime survived for such a long time. It reposed on three pillars, Ministry of the 
Army and the Navy, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Education. By com-
paring the budgets of these three ministries it is visible that almost half of the 
state budget went for their sake. Such amounts became a standard for the whole 
period of the dictatorship, and was even increased. For example, during bud-
get year 1930/1931 for the named three ministries went 47, 9 % of the budget 
totals.63 A year later it increased to 50 %, during fi scal year 1932/1933 it was 
52,1 % in order to the last year of the King Aleksandar regime 1934 this amount 
was just a bit smaller, of 51,3 %.64 
It is important to say that these years were signifi cantly diffi  cult to live 
through because of the global economic crisis’s infl uence on a weak agricul-
tural Yugoslavia. It hit the Kingdom so much that in the year 1931 export was 
33 % and import around 31 % lesser than the year before.65 Cash was con-
stantly lacking. Whatsoever, even in those circumstances the majority of the 
budget went for making the Integral Yugoslav men and for keeping the army 
and the police within the regime. Comparing the elements within the repres-
sive apparatus it is visible that the army was the base of the regime while police 
and gendarmerie played a less important role. During the dictatorship this 
slightly changed, also. Investments in the Ministry of the Interior increased 
especially between 1932 and 1934 when around 13 % of the total budget was 
gone for the ministry named.66 Comparing with around 8 % from the year 
before this represented signifi cant increases.67 During the same time funding 
to the army decreased by about 10 %. During this time army was receiving 
around 30 %$ of the total budget. In such an environment it was surprising 
that between 1932 and 1934 (in the years when the police system was strength-
ened) the army was given just 18 % state budget’s.
63  Statistički godišnjak 1930, vol. II, (Belgrade, 1933), p. 457.
64  Statistički godišnjak 1931, vol. III, (Belgrade, 1934), p. 457., Statistički godišnjak 1932, vol. IV, 
(Belgrade, 1934), p. 466., Statistički godišnjak 1933, vol. V, (Belgrade, 1935), p. 450.
65  F. Tuđman, Hrvatska u monarhističkoj Jugoslaviji, Vol. 2, p. 61.
66  Statistički godišnjak 1932, p. 466., Statistički godišnjak 1933, p. 450.
67  Statistički godišnjak 1930, p. 457.
132
H. ČAPO, In Company with Off enders from the Neighborhood: Polity of the Kingdom of the Serbs...
Th e budget of the Ministry of Education also increased during the King’s 
Aleksandar dictatorship. Instead of the 11 % of the budget, which normally 
was given to this Ministry, between 1932 and 1934 it was increased to around 
20 % of total budget.68 Aft er the assassination of King Aleksandar and relation 
towards repressive apparatus was changed. It seemed that exterior processes 
(beginning of the Second World War) defi ned the fl ow of money within the 
budget. Th e Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education were no 
longer departments of great interest. Th e Ministry of Traffi  c and Ministry of 
the Army and Navy in the light of the preparations for the expected war be-
came the most invested in ministries.69
Polity Character 
One of the defi nitions of the amount of democracy is achieved if three of 
interconnected elements are existing simultaneously: 1 Presence of the institu-
tions and procedures through which citizens are capable of depriving their 
approval of the opposition politics and leaders, 2) presence of the mechanisms 
of controlling and suppressing authoritarian regime, 3) guarantee of civil rights 
to all of the citizens without exception.70 By correlating these values a quanti-
tive amount of democracy can be viewed. 
Th e process of choosing the executive power can be distinguished into 
three forms, which are subordinate the way an authority arranged its devolu-
tion. In literature one can distinguish: 1) unregulated, 2) transitional 3) regu-
lated.71 Evaluating only written forms and laws the Kingdom of SHS (1918-
1921) had regulated ways of changing of chief executives. Regularity was de-
termined by transition of the chief executives either by hereditary (king) or by 
competitive elections (government). 
When evaluating democracy an important part represents the process of the 
competitiveness of the executive recruitment. Th is idea measures the possibility 
of the subordinates of becoming the superordinates. Th e named can be done by 
measuring three categories: 1) Selection 2) Transitional 3) how elections are ar-
ranged. Th e Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia had a selective way of competitiveness 
of its executive supraordinates. Selective way describes a category in which a 
chief executive was determined either by hereditary or by designation or by a 
68  Statistički godišnjak 1932, p. 466., Statistički godišnjak 1933, p. 450.
69  Statistički godišnjak 1936, vol. VII, (Belgrade, 1937), p. 519., Statistički godišnjak 1937, vol. 
VIII, (Belgrade, 1938), p. 399, Statistički godišnjak 1938-1939, vol. IX, (Belgrade, 1939), p. 484., 
Statistički godišnjak 1940., vol. X, (Belgrade, 1941), p. 465.
70  Monty Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project. Political Regime Charach-
teristics and Transitions, 1800-2009. Dataset Users’ Manual, (e-book, Center for Systemic Peace, 
2010), p. 14.
71  Ibid., p. 21.
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combination of those. What this means is that the king (or the court). Th e king’s 
central position in polity making was strengthened even more aft er the procla-
mation of the Vidovdan constitution in 1921. What had to increase parliamenta-
rism in the state, even the democracy was bounded by it, because of the authoriz-
ing of the king’s possibility of being supraordinate to the law.72 
Th ird category of measurement the democracy is Openness of the Execu-
tive Recruitment, i.e. in electoral process every subject had equal opportunity 
to achieve the chief executive power.73 Th is category can be labeled as open 
only and just in the case that every citizen, without exception can enter the 
supraordinate sphere with equal opportunity. 
According to Polity IV Project database the Kingdom of SHS up to 1929 
was a state that had institutionaled recruitment of the chief executives (the 
government). During that period the way of entering the supraordinate sphere 
was a selective one, and openness of the executive recruitment dual (transi-
tional) which was a kind of symbiosis of hereditary and designation of the 
chief executives. Th e king was chosen by heredity and was personally involved 
in the executive power by designation of the President of the government. Th e 
executive recruitment was done by selection and appointed one were only 
those loyal to the regime. Th e king’s exclusive right to choose executive power 
was warranted by the Constitution. All these elements indicate that royal Yu-
goslav parliamentarism was characterized by authoritarian regime.74 
Under these conditions democracy in the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia 
never was really achieved. Expressed in quantitive values (from 0 to 10) the 
highest level of democracy (5) was achieved only during government of Dragiša 
Cvetković (known as the government Cvetković-Maček) from 1939-1941. Th e 
above mentioned value of 5 mean that during this period a kind of controlling 
of the executives existed either through legislative or the institutions of parlia-
mentarism. Th eappearance of democracy was interconnected with the solving 
of the Croatian question by establishing the Banovina of Croatia. For most of 
the rest of the period the king had exclusive power in deciding executive poli-
72  F. Tuđman, Hrvatska u monarhističkoj Jugoslaviji, Vol. 1, p. 342.
73  In the Polity Project it is called XROPEN. Th ere are four diff erent forms of the process: 
closed, dual executive – designation, dual executive-election and open. Th e closed type means 
the executive power is selected /determined through hereditary succession. Th e dual executive-
designation type describes the society where the hereditary takeover of power exists, and the 
president of the government is appointed by the hereditary power bearer (of the court or other 
executive power body). Th e dual executive-election type is the situation when the leadership 
position is assumed hereditary with an appointment and electoral selection of the president of 
the government (executive power chief). Th e open type means that executive power bearer is 
chosen through elections, transitional arrangement between hereditary and appointed power or 
through parliamentary appointment. 
74  Th e term autocracy here means any social regime having a number of the stated political 
characteristics which determine it.
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tics. A diff erence was made aft er the King Aleksandar assassination and during 
the last period of the government of Milan Stojadinović 1937-1939. Further-
more, the king’s will or decision could not be suspended by any of the law 
based argument and using acts and decrees in governing was common. 
Since the implementation of the dictatorship in 1929 up to 1937 the King-
dom of Yugoslavia had a restrictive system of participation in the executive 
government. Th e basic characteristic of this category was excluding of the ma-
jor political groups and their replacement by a pseudo-political one. Th at was 
the case with creation of the uniformed state parties with authoritarian origins, 
the Yugoslav National Party (Jugoslavenska nacionalna stranka – JNS) and 
later the Yugoslav Radical Union (Jugoslavenska radikalna zajednica - JRZ). In 
addition, through these years the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was in a state of a 
repressed political competitivity, i.e. every sign of political opposition was im-
mediately suppressed and, except the government one, no political party was 
allowed. According to the Polity IV Manual when a state being in a repressed 
polity category, as the Kingdom Yugoslavia was at the time, mean that it stands 
for a “totalitarian party systems, authoritarian military dictatorships, and des-
potic monarchies”.75
By entering the government in 1935 Milan Stojadinović made slight chang-
es in losing the regime. Th e Kingdom of Yugoslavia entered a suppressed com-
petitiveness of participation. Th is meant that some political opposition was 
allowed, i.e. was existing and outside government. However, that still meant 
that the government kept surveillance over opposition groups by enforcement 
of the repressive system. In reality HSS was allowed to act and exist but was 
banned from the political arena. Keeping the opposition out was enabled 
through oppression, like massive arrests, censorship of the press and even po-
litical murders. Considering this category improvement was reached only un-
der the Cvetković and Vladko Maček government aft er 1939. During their 
administration the Kingdom of Yugoslavia entered the competitive category of 
participation in political life. Th is state meant that relative stabile political 
groups of diff erent profi liation existed side by side and regularly fought for the 
people’s aff ection. 
By every characteristics of the regime the Kingdom SHS/Yugoslavia can be 
put in the traditional form of autocracy which was characterized by the sharp 
suspension of the competitive political opposition. Th ese sorts of regimes, just 
like the regime of the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia recruited executives out of 
their own political elite.76 Every of the above mentioned category can be mea-
sured, and by the Polity IV Project was put in the quatitive and what’s more 
important a comparative world polity database. Mutual relations of the named 
75  M. Marshall, T. R. Gurr, K. Jaggers, Polity IV Project, p. 26.
76  See: Sonja Dujmović, “Prilog pitanju centralizma: učešće Srba u upravnim tijelima Bosne i 
Hercegovine 1918.-1941.”, Prilozi (Sarajevo), 37 (2008): 75-93.
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categories of the achieved democracy or autocracy give a certain grade de-
noted as Polity.77 If the Polity of the society has a negative value (-) then it is 
considered as mostly authoritarian regime. When the Polity grade is repre-
sented by a positive value (+) a society is considered a democratic one. Grada-
tion is dispersed from -10 to +10 values. Relationship of the authoritarity and 
democracy in the Kingdom SHS/Yugoslavia and surrounding countries are 
described in the following charts. 
Chart 1- Levels of democracy and authoritarity in the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia 
(Source: Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2012 database)78
Chart 2 - Levels of democracy and authoritarity in the Kingdom of Bulgaria 
(Source: Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2012 database)
77  Ecklestein and Gurr described this term as “subsets of the class of authorithy paterns...” 
78  Polity IV Annual time-series 1800-2012 and Polity Ivd Polity case-format 1800-2012 databa-
se accesed at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm (August, 2013). 
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Chart 3 - Levels of democracy and authoritarity in the Kingdom of Romania 
(Source: Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2012 database)
Chart 4 - Levels of democracy and authoritarity in Kingdom of Hungary 
(Source: Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2012 database) 
Chart 5 - Levels of democracy and authoritarity in the Kingdom of Italy 
(Source: Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2012 database)
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Chart 6 - Levels of democracy and authoritarity in Czechoslovakia Republic 
(Source: Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2012 database)
Chart 7 - Levels of democracy and authoritarity in France Republic 
(Source: Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2012 database). 
Chart 8 - Levels of democracy and authoritarity in German Reich 
(Source: Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2012 database)
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Th e charts above show that authoritarian regime of the king Aleksandar 
Karađorđević was not a surprise considering its surrounding neighbors. Royal 
Yugoslavia was surrounded by almost equally authoritarian regimes. From 
these Yugoslavia sometimes learned, and sometimes it tutored its authoritarian 
knowledge. Aft er WWI out of 29 European countries in only 3 of them an 
undemocratic regime existed. In less than twenty years later the number of the 
authoritarian/totalitarian regimes was seventeen.79 Over all in Southeastern 
Europe the dictators were in power. Power of parliaments in these countries 
was equal to nothing, and constitutions were outlawed. In such a manner Al-
bania under King Ahmed Zogu experienced an authoritarian regime by 1928. 
Yugoslavian King Aleksandar took personal control over the state from 1929. 
Bulgarian King Boris copied his regime in 1934. Romanian King Karol sup-
pressed parliamentarism in 1938, and Greece underwent authoritarianism be-
tween 1936 and 1940 under Colonel Ioannis Metaxas.80 
In Italy a totalitarian Fascism was developed from the early 1920s. Austria 
terminated with democracy in the beginning of the 1930s under the govern-
ments of Dr. Engelbert Dolfuss (1932-1934) and of Kurt Schuschnigg (1934-
1938).81 Waves of authoritarianism wasn’t resisted in Hungarian society either, 
which experienced it under Miklós Horthy (1920-1944).82 Authoritarian re-
gime in the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia can’t be researched as a case study 
only, and this is not surprising. Th e Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia was surely a 
state, which experienced the regime, which eventually took control of more 
than half a continent. 
79  Stephen J. Lee, European Dictastorships: 1918-1945, 3rd ed. (New York, 2008), pp. I-II.
80  Ibid., pp. I-II.
81  Ibid., p. 303.
82  Ibid, pp. 307-308.
Chart 9 – Polity case formats of the Kingdom SHS/Yugoslavia and the surrounding states 
1918 - 1941 (Source: Polity IVd Polity-Case Format 1800 - 2012 database)
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Conclusion
• Th e Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia was created by unifi cation of the nations 
that, by that moment, existed independently in diff erent political sur-
roundings. In addition, what kept the interconnection of the nations away 
was the fact that the Kingdom of Serbia represented the victorious and the 
State of SHS stood for the defeated one.
• Formally, the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia represented a parliamentary 
monarchy with given Constitution(s) (with exception 1929-1931). How-
ever, during the whole period of existence the polity of the state was under 
intensive authoritarian regime.
• Th e basic form of autocratic regimes is that one is relying on the repressive 
system. Th e Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia was not an exception and within 
the system included the whole state administrative apparatus by encourag-
ing wide denunciation and spying. 
• By comparison of the Kingdom SHS/Yugoslavia with its surrounding states 
it is notable that similarities of the regimes can be perceived. In this way 
similar regimes existed in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy and Albania. 
• Considering the value of the polity four periods can be defi ned in the King-
dom of SHS/Yugoslavia. Th e fi rst period lasted from the moment of creation 
until introducing the dictatorship. A constant characteristic of this period 
was fi ght between centralistic and anticentralistic political forces. Under the 
surface this fi ght deprived the collision of the Serbian and Croatian national 
policies. Using the repressive system over anticentralistic eff orts of major 
Croatian auspice made the situation of latent violence of Serbian repression 
on Croatian people as the main characteristic of this polity interval. 
• Th e second period lasted during the king’s dictatorship (1929-1934) intro-
duced a strict authoritarian regime. According the Polity IV Project data-
base the Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Bolshevik Russia had slightly le-
nient authoritarian/totalitarian regimes. 
• Th e third period lasted from the assassination of the King Aleksandar in 
1934 until the fall of the Milan Stojadinović’s Cabinet in February of 1939. 
Authoritarian regime was in power but with some changes in the sense of 
the intensity of the repression. Under the regency of the Prince Pavle 
Karađorđević the regime used a slightly milder repression on its oppo-
nents with introducing of certain democratic categories in the polity. 
• Th e fourth period lasted from the moment of the Dragiša Cvetković’s Cab-
inet in February 1939 until the Military coup d’état under General Dušan 
Simović on March 27, 1941. During this period the solving of the Croatian 
question began and the Banovina of Croatia was established as a result of 
the Serbo – Croatian talks. Parallely, the democratic characteristics of the 
Kingdom polity for the fi rst time overcame its authoritarian categories.
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In der Gesellschaft  von Delinquenten aus der Nachbarschaft . 
Politisches Regime im Königreich der Serben, Kroaten und 
Slowenen/Jugoslawien 1918-1941
Zusammenfassung
Königreich der Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen (weiter im Text: Königreich 
SHS) bzw. Königreich Jugoslawien existierte drei und zwanzig Jahre, von 1918 
bis 1941. Dieser Staat wurde in der genannten Periode von ständigen politi-
schen Krisen und starker politischer Repression gekennzeichnet. Eben der 
Herrschaft smodus politischer Eliten war die Hauptursache sämtlicher Unsta-
bilität des Königreichs SHS/Jugoslawien. Deswegen ist die Darstellung der 
Merkmale des politischen Regimes wichtig fürs Verstehen der Genese seiner 
Krise und Unstabilität. 
Die Gesellschaft  des Königreichs SHS/Jugoslawien war in sehr hohem Maß 
autoritativ. Im Beitrag wurden die Resultate des Projektes Polity IV berück-
sichtigt, das vergleichende Angaben über Merkmale von politischen Regimes 
in der Welt und über ihre Veränderungen zwischen den Jahren 1800 und 2010 
liefert. Nach den im Rahmen dieses Projektes gesammelten Angaben überstieg 
das Niveau der Demokratie im Königreich der SHS/Jugoslawien einigermaßen 
das Niveau der autoritären Verwaltung erst in den letzten zwei Jahres seines 
Bestehens, also von 1939 bis 1941.
Aus dem Vergleich der politischen Verwaltung des Königreichs SHS/Jugo-
slawien mit den Nachbarstaaten ergibt sich, dass sie nicht außerordentlich ist, 
das heißt, dass autoritäre Herrschaft sweise von Aleksandar Karađorđević we-
der erstaunlich noch unerwartet in diesem Teil Europas war. Die politische 
Einrichtung des Königreichs SHS/Jugoslawien zeigt die damalige kennzeich-
nende Richtung europäischer sozial-politischer Bewegungen, als sich unmit-
telbar vor dem Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges mehr als die Hälft e des Konti-
nents in totalitären oder autoritären Regimes befand.
